Carpooling and the Economics of Self-Driving Cars

Michael Ostrovsky and Michael Schwarz

Ostrovsky and Schwarz study the interplay between autonomous transportation, carpooling, and road pricing. They discuss how improvements in these technologies, and interactions among them, will affect transportation markets.

The starting point of the project is the observation that transportation will be transformed by three emerging technologies: (i) autonomous driving technology, (ii) technology for timesensitive tolls that can be charged for each road segment without slowing down cars, and (iii) carpooling technology for seamlessly matching cars with multiple passengers. The goal of the project is to explore the issue of designing efficient transportation markets powered by these three technologies.

Of course, tolls and carpooling are not new. However, the frictions currently associated with road pricing and carpooling are very high. These frictions are likely to decrease substantially in the future because of technological improvements.

In the case of tolls, the first generation of the technology involved human toll collectors charging a payment from each passing car. The current generation of toll technology involves costly hardware at the points of toll collection. Both technologies are expensive to operate, are thus limited to only a few major locations, and do not allow toll collection on most road segments. The next generation will reduce the cost of physical toll infrastructure by orders of magnitude because of advances in GPS, mobile, camera/OCR, and other related technologies. It will become practical to charge tolls system wide, street intersection by street intersection, allowing regulators to keep roads toll-free during off-peak hours and to set tolls high enough to keep traffic flowing during rush hour. Technological constraints are not the only potential barrier to the adoption of system-wide tolls: commuters may worry about the distributional consequences of such tolls, or about not benefiting from the toll revenue collected by the government. As the paper explains, introducing tolls in the presence of frictionless carpooling technology helps substantially alleviate these concerns: the two technologies are complementary.

Carpooling is also an old "technology" with a potentially large upside: putting multiple commuters in a car, instead of having them drive solo, would dramatically cut the number of cars on the roads. Various government initiatives have promoted carpooling for over half a century, yet it is still not widely used. Why will the future be different? The answer is, again, technological progress. Perfect carpool partners travel along similar routes at similar times. For many people, there are many compatible carpool partners; however, these partners change day to day because schedules change. Until recently, it was too hard to find a good carpool partner, at least without advance planning, and too inconvenient to coordinate with them. This is changing. New mobile apps automate the process of finding carpool matches, and keep track of user reputation and preferences. The products are still in their infancy, but they demonstrate the potential to substantially lower the frictions associated with carpooling, especially as the technology matures and the network of commuters who use it grows. But viewing technological progress in carpooling in isolation would present an incomplete picture of its potential.

There are strong interdependencies between improvements in autonomous transportation, road pricing, and carpooling. Autonomous transportation makes road pricing and carpooling more convenient and attractive. Road pricing and carpooling reinforce each other: the former makes the latter more attractive, and vice versa.

These observations raise many questions about the efficient design of transportation in light of these technological improvements and interactions among them. How should road prices be set? How should carpooling groups be determined? How much should each of the carpooling passengers pay? How should carpooling interact with road pricing? The proposed modeling framework is designed to address these questions.

The framework blends together ideas from coalition formation games and competitive equilibrium. The framework naturally incorporates interactions between the two components: tolls impact which carpooling coalitions get formed; in turn, the carpooling coalition formation process impacts the demand for roads. The main results show how socially efficient outcomes in such markets might be achieved, taking into account the costs of driving, road capacity, and commuter preferences. An important component of the efficient outcome is the socially optimal matching of carpooling riders. The researchers' approach shows how to set road prices and how to share the costs of driving and tolls among carpooling riders in a way that implements the efficient outcome. The efficient market design for this setting can be "decomposed" into (i) road pricing by the road authorities (where road segments have positive prices only when they are at capacity, and are free otherwise), and (ii) unconstrained coalition formation in which groups of riders are allowed to arrange whichever carpooling trips they want, and can split the costs of those trips in any way they choose. For concreteness, the main results are established in an economy in which all cars are self-driving. However, the researchers also explain how the model and results can be adapted to a world in which some or all cars are conventional.